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Wittgenstein has been painstakingly insistent on several technical terms. Some
of them include 'judgment', 'believe', 'know'. It seems that the latter two are
primarily contrasted by how they relate to doubts i.e., I 'know' that I have two
hands just in case I could not doubt it to be the case that I don't; it isn't
part of the language game that I play for me to not have two hands. I could not
be mistaken, as Wittgenstein might say. Belief, on the other hand, seems to
offer room for doubt. It isn't the case that I believe that I have not been far
from the surface of the Earth because there isn't good reason to doubt that I
haven't; but I perhaps could believe that the Earth was flat if I was taught
incorrectly... Do the ways we are taught to believe change the things that we
can know and doubt? Is this the grounds for kinds of miscommunication? We are
taught differently, we believe and know differently? We play different games?
Judgment, on the other hand, seems far different from the other two. I am still
unclear on how things like judgment and decision fall into this system. They
seem radically different, more about how it is I come to believe and know rather
than aspects of belief and knowing. I 'decide' to belief that the Earth is flat,
I do not 'judge' that I believe so. Do I judge about what I know? Is this how
the two come apart? 

In line 374, Wittgenstein says: 

We teach a child "that is your hand", not "that is perhaps [or "probably"] your
hand". That is how a child learns the innumerable language-games that are
concerned with his hand. An investigation or question, 'whether this is really a
hand' never occurs to him. Nor, on the other hand, does he learn that he 'knows'
that this is a hand. 

Many things jump out at me from this line. First, the innumerability of the
language-games which concern only our hands? Is this about the sheer size and
scope of the things we can say about hands, or perhaps the things that we can
believe or know about them? The things which we can say seem certainly
restricted to the language-games we play, but what we 'mean' with claims about
knowledge and belief fall within these games; Certainly, we restrict what we can
say about hands, but Wittgenstein seems to be offering us avenues in which
questions which would seem like nonsense are not so (and he has gone through
great lengths in the last fifty or so lines to provide instances where certain
questions might not be nonsense). Secondly, "An investigation or question,
'whether this is really a hand' never occurs to him". I am not certain that this
is the case. Perhaps about more 'mundane' facts this is true, but how is it that
we would judge what such a fact were? Is that also ingrained within our
language-game? Certainly, it did not occur to people prior to Copernicus that
the Earth revolved around the Sun, so what spurred Copernicus to his
investigation? Was he not also taught that it was the case that the heavens
surrounded the Earth? 


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