Originally when I had read Carnap's 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology', it was for Professor Grey's Metaphysics course. We had introduced it with the primary focus on answering questions of existence. We compared the idea with other ideas of existence and how certain things existing commit us to certain ontologies. For instance, Quine requires that we are committed to the existence of any bound variable in the existential quantifier, at least for any of our scientific theories. Carnap's idea about frameworks seems quite closely related to this. However, for Carnap, it seems that Quine's position is but one of many distinct possibilities that we could choose. Indeed, other papers we read in that course, such as Meinong's work on fictional objects, also seem as though they can be accommodated by Carnap's work. The position itself seems reasonable: we admit the existence of certain entities insofar as they provide useful for the kind of work we are doing. Electrons exist because our physical theories are well-equipped to deal with them; we can speak of them, describe their properties, and so on. It would be outrageous for us to say, "the electron has such properties as these, but it does not exist". However, it seems hard to commit those who do not share our theories - about more than 'science', especially - to the existence of what our theories posit. Carnap argues that the decisions about which framework to use are largely pragmatic ones. While this sounds remarkably similar to Wittgenstein in 'On Certainty', I am more convinced by Wittgenstein than Carnap on this matter. I am not entirely certain why this is the case; perhaps I just like Wittgenstein more? It might have something to do with the fact that I take Wittgenstein to be saying 'there are many choices, none of which are wholly correct', whereas it feels as though Carnap wants to point at a particular framework and say 'this is it; this is the one framework to rule them all'. It seems terribly difficult to 'convince someone' that their theory is incorrect, or that yours isn't, on pragmatic grounds alone. Pragmatic reasons also don't seem to be the correct sorts of reasons for choosing certain theories in the first place. For instance, it doesn't seem like the pragmatic choice to choose skeptical or antirealist theories over realist ones. Indeed, under Carnap's position, it seems that the lack of pragmatic reasons for accepting something like idealism would be a strike against such a theory, but a strike in what way? If the logic we choose or the principles we prefer also fall under a framework, then it seems that these ways of weighing theories against each other is circular. I guess the point I'm trying to make here is analogous to the point Graham Priest attempts to make in favor of paraconsistent logic. Our reasons for accepting the law of excluded middle are either ungrounded or circular; insofar as Graham Priest has failed to convince me that paraconsistent logic is the way to go, Carnap's argument that pragmatic reasons are how we justify frameworks loses ground. ________________________________________________________________________________ Dilyn Corner (C) 2020-2022