A Correspondence Between Myself and a Classmate Harding Correspondence Paper - Them For Harding, it appears that to have a standpoint, one must be informed by a material reality that is different from that of the norm. In other words, one must simply go through a different set of experiences to draw upon (Harding 54). Even if someone in the dominant group were to have those same experiences, they would still have a different set of interpretative tools that would inform their standpoint. This perspective on how to construct a standpoint seems too broad. It seems that an incredibly small quantity of people would have all of their many identities fall into the normative category, and as such, nearly everyone would be able to have a standpoint. But what if one person fits the norm in all of their identities except one, and in that one they are disadvantaged. According to Harding, they would have a standpoint due to the different experiences that they have had with that one identity (Harding 54). However, that one identity is intersectional with all of that person's other identities, especially those which are in the norm so they would still have a standpoint. Does this mean then that this person's knowledge in areas of scientific inquiry that involve their 'normal' identities, and may serve to be oppressive to the disadvantaged, is also valid knowledge because they too have a standpoint due to their one disadvantaged identity? Response - Me Harding makes it clear on pages 53-55 that the perspective for knowledge creation starting from that of a disadvantaged person in the group is ideal for unique questions and research. Harding says that "for standpoint theories, the grounds for knowledge are fully saturated with history and social life rather than abstracted from it" (57). The experiences that people have feed into their particular standpoint, and the more marginalized groups have the perspective that enables them to ask questions that those in the dominant group cannot think to ask (54). It seems to be the case, then, that for a person who only has a singularly disadvantaging identity across all of their identities will generate illuminating knowledge or ask critical, important questions only if it is the case that these questions arise from their marginalized position in society (56). If their knowledge claims, research motivations, or questions arise from positions not stemming from their disadvantaged standpoint, these questions could possibly be regarded as less useful for maximizing objective results. Collins Correspondence Paper - Me In class we discussed the idea that a major consequence of Collins' position was that one must be a black woman in order to produce black feminist thought. Indeed, Collins says that "living life as Black women requires wisdom since knowledge about the dynamics of race, gender, and class subordination has been essential to Black women's survival" (Collins, 758), and that "for ordinary African-American women, those individuals who have lived through the experiences about which they claim to be experts are more believable and credible than those who have merely read or thought about such experiences" (759). I feel compelled to agree with Collins. As a white (gender expressing) male, I find it hard to fathom the experiences of my black male friends, let alone the experiences had by those who are black _and_ women. Thus, I don't feel comfortable (or justified) in espousing knowledge (wisdom) of the black woman's experience. My primary concern is how this experience could be communicated with people like me, or even vice-versa. Certainly I could not generate new knowledge about what it might mean to be a black woman, but can I collaborate with black feminists on projects to see if we can come up with something new together on Collins' view? Or, in the other direction, could a black woman be justified in claiming to have generated knowledge (wisdom) on the white male experience? Would they even be concerned with doing this kind of work? Response - Them In response to the question of if a black woman's standpoint could be conveyed to a white male, I think that Collins would say that it is not necessary for black women's knowledge to be understood by a white gender-expressing male. I think that she would call for an understanding _that_ black women have valid knowledge, and valid ways of producing knowledge. Because Collins would say that a white male cannot understand this perspective (Collins 748), because they do not share in the experiences or interpretative tools of a black woman, she would merely call for a white male to comprehend THAT their perspective produces valid knowledge as a way to advance the position of black women in society. Additionally, Collins might assert that a black woman could generate knowledge on the white male experience. Because of her social situation as disadvantaged, a black woman would be required to have knowledge to navigate life in institutions that are white male spaces (Collins 758). In order to survive, knowledge on the white male experience would be required. As such, not only would they be concerned with this kind of work, it would be a necessity for them (Collins 758). Bar On Correspondence Paper - Me Bar On discusses throughout her essay how "epistemic privilege" is not a "feminist innovation" (Bar On, 85). We discussed in class that none of the Standpoint Theorists we were covering mentioned anything relating to epistemic privilege, but instead were mainly concerned with epistemic disablement. Thus, Bar On's criticism of Standpoint Theory in terms of epistemic privilege does not really apply as an actual criticism (or strong criticism) of Standpoint Theory. However, one of the primary components of any Standpoint Theory is a stance on epistemic disablement (as seen in Wiley, Collins, and Harding). Bar On points out that "[second-wave feminists] continued to believe that subjects located at the social margins have an epistemic advantage over those located in the social center" (85). While Marx's conception of epistemic privilege is more heavily related to those not invested in the system itself (the proletariat with respect to capitalism) (86), the way that Standpoint Theorists' discuss epistemic disablement makes it seem like their distance from the norm itself is what frees them from being epistemically disabled in the first place with respect to certain domains (for Wylie, academic institutions, for Collins, oppression). If it is the case that being epistemically disabled is a disadvantage for perceiving oppression or injustice in those particular domains, would we not be justified in saying that those located outside of the norm are epistemically 'privileged' in that they are generators of knowledge that cannot be accessed from inside of these norms? If we were to try and argue that these individuals located outside of the norm are not epistemically privileged, it isn't clear what would be gained by their working together with those located within the normal to solve these problems (for Harding's view) or how these marginalized/oppressed persons could claim to have more knowledge about the production of food or clothing outside of saying 'the fairies did it' like those in the normal class (on Collins' view). These marginalized groups seem to have some sort of privilege with respect to the norm; the position of epistemic disablement seems to only have one antithesis: that of epistemic privilege. Response - Them In this case it does not follow that a lack of epistemic disablement constitutes epistemic privilege. There is a critical distinction between bad knowledge, produced by the epistemically disabled, good knowledge, produced by a knower who is able to see beyond the blinders of norms due to their social stiuatedness, and superior knowledge, which would be produced by the epistemically privileged in that it would have to be objective and truly removed from the biases of situatedness to be the best or most true knowledge. However, because a knower cannot be removed from their social position, epistemic privilege would not be possible (Harding 63-64). Instead, standpoint theory then advocates for the best _possible_ knowledge. This is knowledge that is better than what is produced from a disabled perspective: knowledge produced by someone who, for Wylie, has critical distance, for Harding, has a set of experiences different from the norm, and for Collins both a different set of experiences, and a different set of interpretative tools. As such, Bar On's criticism of epistemic privilege does not apply because standpoint theory would deny that a privileged perspective is actually possible. Wylie Correspondence Paper - Them According to Wylie, in order to have a standpoint one must already be a part of a system, which for Wylie is Academic Institutions, and believe in the system (Wylie 163). One must then have a moment of realization in which they comprehend that the system that they are in is not what they though it was, and that they are oppressed within it (Wylie 163). This standard for a standpoint seems very specific, but I do not understand how it is not broad. Although most of my identities are privileged, why can I not develop a standpoint given these criteria? In terms of both academia and other institutions, I have bought into as being correct and non-oppressive systems. However, at different points in my life I have discovered suddenly and jarringly that the system is not set up to be advantageous to me, and instead puts me at a disadvantage. Do I then not have a standpoint on these institutions? Or is it that one must have a specific experience within the institution that shows them that the system is unjust, or can I just critically examine a system, then jarringly realize that its unjust, even when I was a part of it and formerly believed in it? Additionally, must the injustice hinder my ability to be successful within the institution, or can I suddenly realize that it is unjust for others either through a jarring experience or through critical analysis? I do not think Wylie is clear enough here, and I am a bit confused as to what her qualifications for developing a standpoint really are. Response - Me Notice how Wylie describes a "chilly climate" for the women entering academic fields (165-167). These women at MIT discovered that, much to their amazement, "that problems they had assumed to be idiosyncratic - to their personal situation, the peculiarities of their colleagues, the culture of their institutions or disciplinary subfield - were, in fact, widely shared" (166). This revelation - that not only yourself, but your entire social group - is being marginalized in much the same way across the board in a field you are qualified to be in and comparable to your male counterparts to, might be the requirement to achieve critical distance and recognize your position as an outsider within. So while it may be the case that you experience kinds of oppressive acts, their might be some kind of requirement that it be not just with respect to you, but also with respect to a group of people of which you are a member. Notice Wylie's reference to power dynamics and evidence on page 164: the subdominant group becomes acutely aware of their suffering at the hands of the dominant group. This would further seem to support that you would need to be a member of a subdominant group and that your group as a whole is treated more negatively than the one in a position of power. In terms of injustice as how it relates to success, it seems to be necessary that this justice _does_ act to hinder your success. If women in academia are less likely to be paid well or have tenure track positions, this would seem to directly impact one's ability to perform more 'controversial' research that one could not do without tenure protection. I'm not sure if she speaks to this point specifically, but she offers examples about how it has hindered the safety/security and efficacy of women doing research. Longino Correspondence Paper - Me Longino provides an alternative conception of scientific knowledge as that of a consensus by offering a semantic model. She suggests that the semantic view is "a theory as a specification of a set of relations among objects or processes characterized in a fairly abstract way [by a structure]" (114), and that "the structure as specified is neither true nor false; it is just a structure" (114). These models are adequate if we can map some part of them onto the world (115). What's important about these models is that "the relations it picks out are ones in which we are interested" (115). These models then can be judged with respect to our aims or theoretical goals, along with what we want to be able to model (the real world, as it were). My question in similar to Intemann's. Longino says that we can avoid the dilemma of pluralism if we accept that we do not need consensus about our theories from the entire scientific community (114). But if we want to make judgments about someone's theory that we do not agree with, can they not simply escape their criticism by claiming that we have a broad enough consensus with the scientific community we are concerned about as scientists attempting to explain the world? If we don't need consensus from everyone but enough to justify our models with most of the community we participate in, it seems that it is hard to make judgments about theories we do not find to be 'good science' and make those criticisms stick. That is to say, Longino's position on the semantic model and it's ability to divorce consensus from scientific knowledge only seems to make her suggestion even _less_ feminist than it might have been before; androcentric and nonfeminist dominated scientific cultures and communities would simply reply to feminist criticism by saying that their model generates an adequate amount of consensus, properly explains the phenomena they wish to model, and that feminist concerns and aims are not ones their model seeks to supply answers to. Response - Them Initially it seems correct to me to say that it is correct that Longino's doing away with a need for consensus is problematic because it allows for an escape from accountability. Longino puts forth no criteria for how much consensus is needed for an idea to be accepted, so it appears as though one could claim, as you do, that we can arbitrarily claim that we do have enough consensus to accept a theory. However, I do not think that this is the idea that Longino is attempting to get across. Instead, Longino detaches scientific knowledge from consensus in an attempt to avoid an illusion of objectivity (114). Longino intends for a theory to be accepted tentatively, so that if consensus is reached at any point, this does not mean that an ultimate truth has been reached, because a dissenting view could be raised at any point that must be addressed by the community (112,114). As such, Longino's rejection of a need for consensus is not a cop-out, but rather a necessity to ensure that a theory is always subject to change as new information and perspectives are considered (112). Rolin Correspondence Paper - Them In Kristina Rolin's essay, 'Contextualism in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science', Rolin defends the work of Helen Longino. In doing so, she responds to Kristen Intemann, who argues that Longino's social objectivity is relative to the values of a society, and as such, Longino's theory does not necessarily promote feminist views, but rather merely favors diversity (Rolin 25, 32). Rolin responds saying, "Longino's thesis of social objectivity is not as even handed as Intemann and Kourany take it to be" (Rolin 33). Rolin provides little defense to this claim, instead referencing that Intemann calls for a normative feminist theory, thereby implying that Longino does not intend to conform to the standards that Intemann calls for. Instead, this disparity is not a result of a flaw in Longino's theory, but rather a result of the fact that Intemann calls for a normative theory while Longino is attempting to put forth an ideal theory of science (Rolin 33). Regardless, Rolin seems to overlook the observation that diversity is not enough to create change, and that Longino's theory then functions only in isolation of the real world. It appears, then, that since we cannot do good science (because we cannot adhere to Longino's standards given the current social atmosphere) that we cannot reach this utopia that Longino calls for, in order for there to be a good process of knowledge production. As such, what is the point in defending an ideal theory that can never be used as Rolin does? Response - Me I think that Rolin is taking Intemann's criticism of Longino's thesis very seriously here. While it is indeed the case that Longino is constructing an ideal theory, it seems that Rolin considers this theory to give us at least some proper tools by which we can measure the efficacy of our science She says that "Longino challenges this view by arguing that no method of scientific inquiry can guarantee that an accepted hypothesis or theory is fully value-free. Instead of embracing an unfeasible ideal, philosophers of science should acknowledge that the influence of moral and social values on scientists' choice of background assumptions is not necessarily a sign of bad science" (Rolin, 26). In other words, Longino's thesis provides a kind of solution to the criticism being levied against mainstream and usual scientific practices. It seems that to bridge the gap from this older way of doing it to what Longino is proposing we would need to spell out exactly what it is that these scientists are valuing and how it is impacting their practices. In addition to this, we would need to develop an understanding of how to progress from that point, or how to change these practices to fall in line with this ideal theory. This is where Rolin’s notion of a defense commitment and default entitlements come into play (38). This analysis of what an epistemic justification looks like for certain baseline entitlements (moral and social values, as Rolin might put it) allows us to get from where we currently are to where we need to be in terms of our practices. Longino does not explicitly tell us how we can enforce or begin to use her ideal theory’s epistemic practices, but Rolin provides an account of how exactly these communities are supposed to function and what these forms of criticism and review would look like - questioning and examining kinds of basic values and beliefs scientists hold and seeing whether they are impacting the science being produced. Nelson Correspondence Paper Nelson opens her paper about Epistemic Communities with a quote from Glashow. She uses this quote to establish a view on evidence to contrast her own position with (131). Nelson says that that Glashow has an implicit assumption in his account: "there is one (and only one) true account of the world" (133). She then says that there are "indefinitely many theories that would enable us to successfully explain and predict experience, and that no single system would be better than all others" (133-134). She then goes on to say that "it is commensurate with what we know and have experienced that an alternative theory of nature... might equally well explain and predict what we experience" (134). I find this position convincing at first, but after thinking about it I find myself unconvinced that this is actually true. These theories would have the same consequences; that is to say, these theories allow us to infer similar experiences that accords with the evidence we gather, and we would not be able to distinguish one theory from the other. But if these theories all have the same consequences, and these theories are inferred from the same set of premises (empirical data, theoretical models, etc.), then it would seem to be the case that these theories have similar links. That is to say, what they're about is the same. Thus, all of these theories are true accounts of the world (at least with regards to the evidence we currently have). But if they all have the same consequence and they are all derived from the same information, wouldn't it then be the case that these are all really just the same theory? It seems that if I can swap one theory out for another and arrive at the same conclusions, they were indeed equivalent in such a way that they were actually identical in some deeper way. It seems to me to be the case that, in fact, these theories are all actually the same theory; thus, there is only 'one theory' (Glashow's point), the only difference between them being in their names. Response - Them Nelson also rejects Glashows three assumptions in her article of faith. It appears that you have established another reason that we should reject Glashow's third assumption that "scientific investigation is such that, at some finite point, the evidence that we acquire for a view finally and decisively rules out all alternative views" (Nelson 131). Glashow's theory seems self affirming because if we all do have the same experiences, and arrive at the same conclusions, then it must be true that all of our theories about the world are simply different articulations of the same understanding. And because there is only one truth, then there can be only one true theory to describe it, which people are merely describing in different ways. However, Nelson thinks that it is not even necessary to object to Glashow on this point, because the third assumption is dependent upon the second; "Our sensory organs are sufficiently refined to discriminate that truth from other candidates for truth" (132) This stems from an assumption that everyone is having the same experiences from which to draw knowledge. Even if this were possible, due to our situatedness, we would have different interpretative tools to unpack these experiences, meaning that we would inevitably arrive at different true pieces of the "one full and unique truth about the world" (132). It is from this objection that Nelson launches her theory that individuals are not the knowers, but that rather, communities are (142). Tuana Correspondence Paper - Them In her section on Willful ignorance, Tuana outlines the problem with a defeatist epistemology, that is, an epistemology that is meant to counter another way of acquiring knowledge. In the case of an epistemology that backs up ignorance to some knowledge, it simply would not be possible for this ignorance to be overcome, even when contrary information is available and knowable to someone (Tuana 10-11). Because their way of knowing does not allow them to come to know some things, they actively choose to ignore the knowledge that is presented to them, because their epistemology does not allow them to see it as valid knowledge. As such, it would be necessary to change one's entire epistemology for them to be able to shed this ignorance (Tuana 10-11). But because they are not receptive to the knowledge that would motivate them to change their epistemology, it appears as though they would be trapped. In this way, how would it be possible to break the cycle of willful ignorance? How can someone be motivated to change their entire epistemology to realize their willful ignorance? Response - Me This brings up two very important questions: how do we break the cycle and what are the motivations for this. Both seem intimately related to each other. Tuana says that "willful ignorance is a deception that we impose upon ourselves, but it is not an isolated lie we consciously tell ourselves, a belief we know to be false but insist on repeating. Rather, willful ignorance is a systematic process of self-deception, a willful embrace of ignorance that infects those who are in positions of privilege, an active ignoring of the oppression of others and one's role in that exploitation" (Tuana, 11). It seems that it is a requirement on this account of willful ignorance that there be some kind of revelation to the individual that they are being deceived. Tuana doesn't explicitly give us any sort of tools by which we can cause this revelation to occur or how exactly we are to dismantle the structure that is causing us to deceive ourselves. She does say, pulling from Spelman, that "a desire to have the facts... be false, coupled by a fear that they are not, but where the consequences of their being true are so high, it is better to cultivate ignorance" (11). It seems that the only real way to motivate this kind of change is to demonstrate that these facts are true and that their fear is justified, and that the consequences, while awful, can be changed. It may be the case that if these consequences are demonstrated to be fixable, the need for self-deception will disappear: the privileged person will be able to stop ignoring these facts and participate in a meaningful way. Alcoff Correspondence Paper - Me In class it was discussed that Alcoff's return to an objective reason was a sort of circling back to where we started; we began the semester with authors throwing away objective reason as it was traditionally viewed to propose theories and ideas that would support feminist values and produce 'good science'. However, Alcoff makes the striking statement that "thought must be gauged by something that is not thought" (55), a claim that is opaque, if not entirely confusing - after all, most judgments are made through thought. But it seems to be the case that, instead of this being some kind of vicious circle where we merely arrive back where we started, Alcoff is instead condemning the practices of earlier feminist epistemologists like Harding, Collins, or Longino. Alcoff, when speaking of Okri, says that "open spaces for the development of critical and creative reason are rapidly shrinking as universities themselves become corporatized, 'digital diploma mills' instrumentalized by a war economy engaged in global imperial projects" (53). The move by universities to become corporatized academies leads to a sort of knowledge production rife with problems, Horkheimer calling them "a liquidation of the subject... the atrophied ability to resist or critique" (53). The projects of the academy are tainted by the throes of capitalism, endangering knowledge and leading to the kind of ignorance Alcoff spends the majority of her paper discussing. Indeed, this problem seems intimately related to Mills' discussion of the consensual hallucination (49). Alcoff later goes on to claim that "one might well take such a view to be a denial of the constitutive relationship between knowledge and power" (56), which seems entirely to be a jab at Longino and others like her. It seems, therefore, that Alcoff might be taking what has been generated by these previous theorists about ignorance and power, and extending that work to its logical conclusion: if we are in fact to attempt and judge our science with how it upholds feminist values and criticizes out of the practice of knowledge production other views that disagree with it, are those who attempt to have knowledge serve feminist ideals "no better than those who would put it to the service of capitalism" (56)? Response - Them It appears that as Alcoff attempts to assert the necessity of objectivity, she is pointing out a bias in striving to make an epistemology feminist (Alcoff 53). It seems that she is saying that a feminist epistemology assumes that feminist values are correct in the creation of the epistemology, when this is itself an assumption because in an epistemology created specifically to be supportive of marginalized identities will be constructed in such a way that sexist ideas cannot be considered knowledge, creating a type of willful ignorance (Alcoff 53, Tuana 10-11). In your analysis, though, you say that Alcoff would disagree with earlier theorists like Longino. It seems to me, that Longino's four criteria, if adhered to in the way that Longino intends, would create a type of objectivity that is equally as critical of feminist ideas as sexist ones, thereby accounting for the problem that Alcoff raised here (Longino 112). It would allow for some level of objectivity. As such, I am unsure just how much Alcoff would disagree with Longino, although she does say that “thought must be gauged by something that is not thought" (Alcoff 55), it seems that Longino's theory would still fall under some level of scrutiny. Regardless, one major differences that fuels Alcoff's belief in objectivity is a different definition of knowledge altogether (Alcoff 54). Instead of knowledge being something to be obtained (regardless of whether or not it is constantly in the process of being changed), Alcoff conceptualizes knowledge as a process that takes place between social points (Alcoff 54). As such, knowledge can be assessed differently than it is by other theorists, opening up the possibility for an objective feminist epistemology. Lugones Correspondence Paper - Them On page 476, Lugones describes the dominant group's perception of themselves as having objective, 'pure' thought. She describes a scenario in which the marginalized group must become familiar with this perception of objective thought to navigate the dominant group’s structured world (Lugones 466). However, being in a marginalized position, Lugones seems to allude to epistemic privilege, saying that marginalized people can come to understand both this perception of objectivity, as well as situated knowing (Lugones 476-477). Lugones seems to pose this as a method of resistance, or breaking free of the dominant groups control (Lugones 477), but also addresses the concern that a marginalized person coming to an understanding of the 'objective, pure' way of thinking could lead to them turning, and imposing this structure upon other marginalized identities (Lugones 466). However, I am confused as to how this understanding can be used. How is Lugones' proposed 'way out' of the oppressive cycle actually going to work? It seems like it only grants marginalized groups knowledge that the dominant group would be ignorant to. I understand how it disrupts ideas of objective thought, but I fail to see how this might fundamentally change the system as a whole. Response - Me To me, it is also unclear how this would be a way of fundamentally changing the system. Instead, it seems to be a method for preserving one's sense of self. Oppressed groups are forced to trade in the language and logic of pure thought and separation (Lugones, 477). But I think it's important to understand that this goal is itself an incredibly important point on what this resistance itself looks like. This resistance is an attempt by people to not allow a system to destroy them and their culture; it is the way in which they can remain curdled, and to not become like the lover of purity (466). To avoid losing this, Lugones says that "we have to constantly consider and reconsider the question: Who are our own people?" (477). Thus, this resistance is a way of survival and not allowing the system to destroy you, to remain curdled. Lugones believes that this is an active them, saying "curdle-separation is not something that happens to us but something we do" (478). She also says "though transparents fail to see its sense, and thereby keep its sense from structuring our social life, that we curdle testifies to our being active subjects, not consumed by the logic of control... [curdling] can become an art of resistance, metamorphosis, transformation" (478). This act of resistance is a maintenance of the self in a world where there are constant attempts to destroy you, to separate you out. The goal then is not to destroy the system, but survive in it, and hope it changes in response. Spelman Correspondence Paper - Me In Elizabeth Spelman's paper 'Managing Ignorance', she gives us details on what the managing of ignorance would look like and its motivations. Spelman, pulling from Baldwin, argues that "there is something whites are unwilling to believe, namely, that black America's grievances are real" (Spelman, 120), and follows it up with an account of what whites managing their ignorance would look like. Later, Spelman brings up the decades following the Civil War and how ignorance was managed then, providing an historical account. Spelman says "the decades after the Civil War in the United States provide a host of examples made almost to order in support of Baldwin's claim about white America's ability to manage ignorance by inoculating itself against inquiry into and knowledge of the horrors of white racism" (126). She brings up Woodrow Wilson's speech fifty years after the Civil War, saying that "by this point reconciliationists had put decades of concerted effort into 'banish[ing] slavery and race from the discussion' of the war", and she quotes David Blight as saying "can we say happy is the nation that hath no history" (128). But it seems to me that this isn't the case for managing ignorance, as Spelman might want it to be, but rather a different kind of ignorance. Managing ignorance seems to be done on the individual level, as a very active kind of thing (W does not believe that g is true and does not want to believe that g is true), but this later account seems to be more about an ignorance like 'you do know and they do not want you to know', as Tuana would put it. Is this perhaps a broader account of what managing ignorance may look like, or am I misreading Spelman? Response - Them I do agree with you that this account seems problematic, though I do think that she is intending to put forth these perspectives as ways of managing ignorance, though in such a way that also perpetuates further ignorance. When these prominent figures take on a perspective that does not address the racial element of history, they are managing the ignorance of the past, in an attempt to move beyond it to the future. However, in doing so from a dominant perspective that denies history and promoting a sort of 'blindness' to the past, the ignorance shifted to from 'you do not know and you do not want to know' to a 'you do _not_ know and they do not want you to know.' As such, these statements are examples of managing ignorance because they are a mechanism requiring effort to maintain the ignorance both on the part of the speaker, and the individual (Spelman 123). In saying "can we say happy is the nation that hath no history" (Spelman 128), the idea is being reinforced that ignorance to the past is the path forward, encouraging people to also adopt a mindset of not knowing, thereby immunizing the dominant group from needing to deal with the racially charged ideologies of the past, allowing them to continue. So, Spelman has illustrated here how statements like these fulfill the four entailments of ignorance, portraying them as a method of managing the ignorance of the past to create a different, resilient form of ignorance in the present. Bailey Correspondence Paper - Them Bailey discusses strategic ignorance, and the use of ignorance by marginalized groups. She says that the ignorance of the dominant group can be used as a form of resistance by the marginalized group, using the analogy of the marginalized group being "servants" in the "master's house" (Bailey 87). Because the masters carry preconceived notions about the marginalized group, the servants can use their understanding of the systems put in place by the masters to subjugate them as a method of navigating and surviving the environment (Bailey 87). Bailey portrays this as a form of resistance to the dominant group's subjugation (Bailey 77). It seems to me, though that while this is a method for survival under an oppressive system, that this is not actually resistance, but instead plays into the dominant group's perception of the marginalized people. As such, using the stereotypes as a method of survival perpetuates the ideas and systems under which the marginalized group is oppressed. Can it be considered resistance if it is not concerned with finding a way to break free of the system of oppression? This situation even goes so far as to support systems of oppression, so can it really be considered a form of resistance, with the exceptions of extreme cases like that of Fredrick Douglass which do eventually break the system of oppression? Response - Me You mention Frederick Douglass as an extreme case of strategic ignorance in which he is able to undermine the system in place to achieve something previously denied to him. It doesn't seem to be the case that this 'breaks free of the system' or demolishes barriers present to every nonwhite individual at the time. It might simply be the case that strategic ignorance is not concerned with destroying the entire system of racial prejudice or systemic problems in our society. Rather, it is a tool available to those who are marginalized to be able to survive. Bailey says that strategic ignorance "can be wielded by groups living under oppression as a way of gaining information, sabotaging work, avoiding or delaying harm, and preserving a sense of self" (Bailey, 77). This seems to be what the resistance is about. The acts of resistance are acts of survival or subversion, intended to only benefit that one person and not all people. So yes, it doesn't do anything to end the stereotypes or stop ignorant people from being ignorant, it enables marginalized and oppressed groups to resist the system itself by denying what the system says about them as people. Indeed, Bailey says that "people of color have historically been portrayed as unintelligent, childlike, hypersexual, or primitive. Strategic ignorance is a way of expediently working with a dominant group's tendency to see wrongly" (88). It seems more like a sort of localized liberation than a broad one, more about surviving and acquiring much needed skills or knowledge in a system that would deny it to an individual than to give it to everyone in the group. Pohlhaus Correspondence - Me Gaile Pohlhaus devotes a section of her essay to caveats to what she says earlier about wrongful requests. She says that she does not "condemn those who _do_ understand others in ways that shortcut their own agency" (Pohlhaus, 237). She says that, to safely navigate power relations in the world, one may be forced to understand how others view the world, even when such force "leaves little or no room for [their] own agency" (236). In short, she is attempting to only condemn this wrongful requests and point out the agency-limiting behavior of those who perform them, rather than those who assent to the reduction of their own agency. However, this stressed point concerns me. Pohlhaus says that "the white storeowner ought to understand how his use of a buzzer system is unjust", even though he may not be aware of the injustice (236). She says that "the meaning of my words and actions is not, nor should it be, determined solely by what I think or want them to mean... often persons in dominant positions say and do things that effectively harm others without expressly thinking that is what they are doing" (236). It seems that, not only is the oppressed person's agency attempting to be limited, but that they also must walk a tight-rope to navigate these requests they come across each day. It would appear to be the case that the onus is both on and not on the oppressed individual to assent or dissent to the limiting of their own agency. If they do not deny the request, they are harmed; if they do deny the request, the oppressor will be none the wiser as to their own action. Nothing will change in either case, and yet there will be serious risk to the marginalized individual. How is it that they can navigate this double bind? Is there some way out so that both individuals are positively impacted? Does Pohlhaus provide such a method? Pohlhaus Response - Them It appears to me that Pohlhaus does not place as much duty on the place of the marginalized person as it may seem. When she says "Instead, I am arguing that we should approach others and have the right to expect to be approached by others in ways that enable an equitable range of possibilities for meaningful action" (236), she _is_ putting the responsibility on the marginalized person to alert the dominant person to their unjust action. However, earlier Pohlhaus also said "an attempt on the part of the white storeowner to understand or follow reasoning that supports the view that his actions are wrong might be difficult or painful for him, since he may like to think of himself as someone who acts rightly. That this is difficult or painful, however, in no way unfairly limits his possibilities for action" (236). Here, it is implied that the white storeowner ought to also take some responsibility for understanding the perspectives of others, even though it makes him uncomfortable. As such, the marginalized person is not caught in a complete double- blind trap, rather they are disadvantaged in the situation, because there is no motivation for the white storeowner to attempt to understand another perspective (236). ________________________________________________________________________________ Dilyn Corner (C) 2020-2022